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Motivated by kidney exchange, we study the following mechanism-design problem: On a directed graph (of
transplant compatibilities among patient–donor pairs), the mechanism must select a simple path (a chain of
transplantations) starting at a distinguished vertex (an altruistic donor) such that the total length of this path
is as large as possible (a maximum number of patients receive a kidney). However, the mechanism does not
have direct access to the graph. Instead, the vertices are partitioned over multiple players (hospitals), and each
player reports a subset of her vertices to the mechanism. In particular, a player may strategically omit vertices
to increase how many of her vertices lie on the path returned by the mechanism.
Our objective is to find mechanisms that limit incentives for such manipulation while producing long
paths. Unfortunately, in worst-case instances, competing with the overall longest path is impossible while
incentivizing (approximate) truthfulness, i.e., requiring that hiding nodes cannot increase a player’s utility by
more than a factor of 1+𝑜 (1). We therefore adopt a semi-randommodel where a small (𝑜 (𝑛)) number of random
edges are added to worst-case instances. While it remains impossible for truthful mechanisms to compete
with the overall longest path, we give a truthful mechanism that competes with a weaker but non-trivial
benchmark: the length of any path whose subpaths within each player have a minimum average length. In
fact, our mechanism satisfies even a stronger notion of truthfulness, which we call matching-time incentive
compatibility. This notion of truthfulness requires that each player not only reports her nodes truthfully but
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For many years, the patients in need of a kidney transplant have far outnumbered the organs
available from deceased donors [24]. While many patients can find a friend or relative willing to
donate a live organ to them, medical incompatibilities frequently prevent such a direct donation.
Kidney-exchange platforms address this problem by matching patients to kidneys across multiple
patient–donor pairs. The overarching goal in designing these platforms is to maximize the number
of patients who receive transplants, i.e., the welfare of the matching. The input to the mechanism
can be represented as a compatibility graph, a directed graph whose nodes represent patient–donor
pairs, and where an edge indicates that the first pair’s donor can donate to the second pair’s patient.
Traditionally, research on kidney exchange has focused on matchings
1
consisting of disjoint
2-cycles and 3-cycles. Cycles are a natural choice because a paired donor can only be expected to
donate a kidney if her patient receives one; the short length of cycles allows surgeries to proceed
simultaneously and thus prevents donors from reneging. In this body of work, compatibility graphs
are often modeled by classes of densely connected random graphs. If these random graphs are
sufficiently large, 2- and 3-cycles can match essentially all pairs that one could hope to match [3].
However, these properties of the random model do not reflect the observation that, in real kidney-
exchange platforms, more complex matchings can match substantially more patient–donor pairs [2].
Indeed, subsequent work [2, 11] has highlighted that welfare can be increased substantially by
one such form of matchings in particular: long chains starting at non-directed altruistic donors.
These donors, which we simply refer to as altruists in the rest of the paper, are donors willing to
donate a kidney without requiring a transplant in exchange. When an altruist donates a kidney, a
compatible patient can receive a kidney before her donor donates to another patient. Thus, even
if one of the donors should renege, no pair will have donated without having received a kidney
in return, which means that simultaneous transplantations are no longer required. Since donors
still renege very infrequently [10], an altruistic donor can in principle be at the beginning of an
arbitrary-length chain of donations.
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In this paper, we study the problem of finding such a long path starting from a given altruist.
For this path to obtain high welfare, the path must usually extend across patient–donor pairs in
multiple hospitals. However, finding such a path across hospitals is complicated by the fact that
the centralized path-finding mechanism cannot directly observe the patient–donor pairs at each
hospital and must rely on hospitals to accurately report them. Since hospitals feel primarily bound
to their own patients’ well-being, a hospital might choose not to register certain pairs if this will
lead the platform to match more of its other pairs [4]. Thus, the problem of finding long paths in
kidney exchange is one of mechanism design, which means that we search for mechanisms that
incentivize hospitals to truthfully report all their clients, which is known as incentive compatibility.3
In fact, we propose the stronger notion of matching-time incentive compatibility, in which
hospitals have additional opportunities for manipulation after the mechanism has determined a
path. At any node on the path belonging to a hospital, the hospital may receive the kidney and
then use it to divert the original path to a continuation within its own subgraph. Matching-time
incentive compatibility requires that hiding vertices, diverting the path, or a combination of both
does not pay off. We believe this stronger notion of incentive compatibility, which generalizes the
widely-used incentive property of individual rationality, to be of independent interest. Throughout
1
As is customary in the kidney-exchange literature, we use the word “matching” differently from most of computer science.
A matching is a set of edges in a directed graph such that each node has indegree and outdegree at most one, and for each
node (except for the altruist, which we define later), the outdegree is at most the indegree.
2
As of February 2021, one particular chain has led to 114 successful transplants and is still ongoing.
3
For ease of exposition, we assume that hospitals can hide nodes, not individual edges. However, as discussed in Section 6,









Fig. 1. Illustration for stitching together two paths 𝜋1 and 𝜋2. If the red edge exists, we can stitch the paths
together to obtain the yellow path.
this paper, we consider
(
1 + 𝑜 (1)
)
-approximate versions of these incentive properties. That is, if
manipulation can increase a hospital’s utility by at most a factor of
(
1 + 𝑜 (1)
)
, we assume that
hospitals can be convinced to participate truthfully, which is in the common interest.
On worst-case graphs, simple counterexamples show that welfare maximization and incentive
compatibility are incompatible (Section 3.1). This impossibility holds even for generous approximate
notions of welfare maximization and incentive compatibility. On the other extreme, if the compati-
bility graphs were purely random Erdős-Rényi graphs, the problem would become easy for most
parameter settings: either there are no long paths or there is a Hamiltonian cycle. Unfortunately, in
practice, kidney-exchange compatibility graphs do not resemble Erdős-Rényi graphs due to issues
such as sensitization and the dynamic nature of how patients enter and exit the system.
Adopting a semi-random approach, we show that one can obtain interesting positive results
by adding a small number of random edges to worst-case graphs. Notably, edges may be added
with probability 1/𝑛𝑐 for 1 < 𝑐 < 2, meaning that only a vanishing fraction of vertices will be the
endpoint of a random edge. To our knowledge, these are the first positive results for semi-random
graphs with edge probabilities in 𝑜 (1/𝑛).
In contrast to purely random models, our semi-random model captures a wide range of com-
patibility graphs, including very sparse and heterogeneous ones. While the random edges do
not directly model a clinical phenomenon,
4
we interpret them as a mild regularity condition on
the graph, expressing that a given path in one hospital’s subgraph and a given path in another
hospital’s subgraph are likely to be linked by at least one edge. Since these random edges are only
assumed to exist between pairs of different hospitals, the hospital subgraphs themselves can be
purely worst case, somewhat like in the semi-random model of Makarychev, Makarychev, and
Vijayaraghavan [23].
1.1 Our Techniques and Results
Even in our semi-random model, maximum welfare is at odds with incentive compatibility. This
is shown by the family of instances in Section 3.2, in which it is impossible to compete with the
optimal path without creating incentives for misrepresentation. As we discuss in Section 3.3, these
instances are problematic because any high-welfare path must visit one hospital’s subgraph many
times but spend few steps there each time, a scenario which incentivizes hospitals to hide outgoing
edges to other hospitals. It is natural, then, that we can overcome this impossibility result by
benchmarking our mechanism against the longest path such that, for each hospital, the subpaths
the hospital’s subgraph have some minimum average length.
The random edges in our model are so sparse that they, by themselves, do not form paths of
significant length. The main insight, however, is that they allow us to “stitch together” sufficiently
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One medical justification for these random edges could be that some exchanges perform blood-type incompatible trans-
plantations when tissue-type profiles are well compatible [17]. Since we insert random edges only for a 𝑜 (1) fraction of
agents, such phenomena need not be frequent to support our model.
long paths of worst-case edges inside different hospitals. Indeed, suppose that 𝑝 is the probability
of a random edge existing, and that 𝑠 is a parameter such that 𝑠2 𝑝 ≫ 1. As illustrated in Fig. 1, let
there be two paths 𝜋1, 𝜋2 of length greater than 𝑠 , each internal to a different hospital. Then, the
expected number of edges from the the 𝑠 last nodes of 𝜋1 to the first 𝑠 nodes of 𝜋2 is high. If any of
these edges do exist, we can use them to “stitch” 𝜋1 and 𝜋2 together. Then, nearly all nodes of 𝜋1
and 𝜋2 will lie on the stitched path except at most 2 𝑠 nodes in the suffix of 𝜋1 and the prefix of 𝜋2.
Roughly speaking, our mechanism has the following structure: From the graph reported by the
hospitals, the mechanism chooses a set of disjoint paths within each hospital so that total length is
large, and so that truthful reporting maximizes the total length of a hospital’s chosen paths. Then,
the mechanism stitches these internal paths together, which will succeed with high probability.
Successfully stitched paths preserve the welfare and hospital utility except for small stitching losses,
which gives approximate guarantees on welfare and incentive compatibility.
Since our mechanism can stitch long enough paths with high probability, it can select the internal
paths of hospital 𝑖 (mostly) based on the subgraph reported by hospital 𝑖 . As a result, each hospital
wants to reveal all its nodes to increase the total length of its chosen paths. If, by contrast, the
mechanism chose its path by how well nodes are connected via cross edges, hospitals might hide
connections to other hospitals to sway the mechanism to match more of their own nodes instead.
Challenges in translating this high-level structure into concrete mechanisms include:
The choice of original paths. The paths within each hospital initially selected by the mechanism
must compete with the benchmark in terms of welfare, and must lend themselves to stitching.
The number of paths per hospital. Stitching only works if we alternate the hospitals on a chain,
so we cannot stitch too many paths by a single hospital.
Internal paths too short for stitching. The altruist might only be able to reach long paths via
an initial sequence of short internal paths connected by worst-case cross edges. In this case,
we do have to consider worst-case cross edges in deciding where to stitch while also ensuring
that incentives are limited.
Our main result is the following:





. Let AvgOpt𝑠 be the longest path from the altruist such that, for each hospital, the average
length of the subpaths in this hospital’s subgraph is at least 𝑠 (or the hospital does not own any nodes
on the path).





|AvgOpt𝑠 | assuming truthful responses, and that ensures that each hospital can only increase its
utility by lower-order terms through manipulation, including matching-time manipulation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 1.2, we discuss related work on kidney
exchange and semi-randommodels. In Section 3, we present lower bounds on the welfare guarantees
achievable by incentive-compatible mechanisms, both in the worst case and in our semi-random
model. We also explain why our welfare benchmark restricting the average length of subgraphs
for each hospital is a natural way to circumvent these impossibilities. In Section 4, we present a
simple mechanism that gives lower guarantees in terms of welfare and incentive properties, and
also displays key ideas of our full mechanism, which we present in Section 5. Section 6 discusses
alternative modeling assumptions and how they would affect the problem. We conclude in Section 7.
1.2 Related Work
There is a rich body of research on algorithm and mechanism design for kidney exchange [1, 3,
6, 7, 19, 26], much of which we have already mentioned. Even though an influential paper by
Ashlagi and Roth [4] specifically identified hospital incentives and altruist-initiated chains as the
two main challenges in increasing the welfare of kidney exchange in practice, we know of no
existing positive results accounting for both aspects, which is perhaps understandable in light of
the robustness of worst-case results as those in Section 3.1.
5
If matchings are restricted to unions
of 2-cycles, Ashlagi, Fischer, Kash, and Procaccia [1] give an incentive-compatible mechanism with
good welfare guarantees, but their approach does not extend to richer matchings.
Whenever a problem is intractable for worst-case inputs and specific input distributions are hard
to justify, semi-random models can allow for positive results while retaining substantial generality.
In most works that apply semi-random models, the motivating intractability is computational
complexity. For instance, Blum and Spencer [8] pioneered semi-random models in the context of
3-coloring, which is NP hard in the worst case. One of their models starts from an adversarially
chosen 3-colored graph and then, independently for each pair of differently colored nodes, toggles
the existence of an edge between the two nodes with some small probability 𝑝 . If 𝑝 ≥ 𝑛−0.6+𝜖
(and all colors have Ω(𝑛) nodes), an efficient algorithm 3-colors the resulting graph with high
probability. Since then, many authors have investigated other computational problems in related
models [15, 16, 22]; we refer the reader to Feige [14] for a survey of the literature. Semi-random
models are also used in smoothed analysis [13, 25], again driven by complexity considerations. As
in our work, one can understand positive results as saying that worst-case instances have to be
constructed in a very brittle way, which hopefully makes them unlikely to appear in practice.
Only in few cases have semi-random models been applied for desiderata other than complexity.
The most prominent example is the use of random-order models for online algorithms [18, 20, 21],
where a random arrival order makes the problem more tractable in an information-theoretic
sense. In certain versions of the secretary problem, for instance, an adversary chooses a set of
quality scores, but the order in which the algorithm sees these scores is chosen uniformly at
random. Here, assuming a random arrival order is not a tool for easier computation; instead, it
increases the best approximation ratio of any algorithm from 1/𝑛 to 1/𝑒 . Babaioff, Immorlica, and
Kleinberg [5] combine these ideas with mechanism design in order to design auctions that are
incentive compatible when a set of buyers with worst-case valuations arrive in random order. The
fact that monetary transfers are available in this setting gives their mechanisms a flavor decidedly
different from ours.
We are not aware of existing work on semi-random models that gives positive results with edge
probabilities as low as ours. As two examples of work giving relatively low edge probabilities,
Makarychev et al. [23] find planted balanced cuts for edge probabilities in polylog(𝑛)/𝑛 for balanced
cuts; Chen, Sanghavi, and Xu [9] recover clusters for a similar range of probabilities in a different
semi-random model. By contrast, our approach can handle edge probabilities as low as 1/𝑛2−𝜖 .
Our work is most closely related to that of Blum et al. [7], who design mechanisms for kidney
exchange in a different semi-random model. Their model is semi-random in that, in a worst-case
compatibility graph, the nodes are allocated randomly to the hospitals. For matchings composed
of disjoint constant-length cycles, their mechanism guarantees optimal welfare and individual
rationality up to lower-order terms, a much weaker notion than matching-time incentive compati-
bility. Blum et al. acknowledge that, unfortunately, their approach “does not seem to extend beyond
individual rationality,” and they provide an impossibility result showing that individual rationality
cannot be obtained if long paths from altruistic donors are allowed.
An argument closely related to the stitching technique described in Section 1.1 was used by
Dickerson and Sandholm [12] in the proof of their Proposition 2. However, we make much heavier
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While one paper [19] claims to overcome these impossibilities in a repeated setting, there are concerns about the validity
of their results, which we have raised with the authors.
use of this technique: Whereas Dickerson and Sandholm perform a single stitching between
two specified subgraphs, we construct a long path consisting of many stitchings across multiple
subgraphs.
2 MODEL
Let there be a finite, directed base graph 𝐺base = (𝑉 , 𝐸base), where 𝑛 B |𝑉 |. Let the vertices 𝑉 be
partitioned into subsets 𝑉𝑖 for each of finitely many hospitals 𝑖 . Let 𝐸𝑝 denote the random variable
ranging over subsets of
⋃
𝑖≠𝑗 (𝑉𝑖 ×𝑉𝑗 ), where each potential edge is included in 𝐸𝑝 independently
with some given edge probability 𝑝 . While our results hold for a wider range of 𝑝 , we are primarily
interested in very low values of 𝑝 , which might, for example, scale as 1/𝑛𝑐 for 1 < 𝑐 < 2. The
compatibility graph is defined by adding the random edges to the base graph, i.e., as𝐺 B (𝑉 , 𝐸base ∪
𝐸𝑝 ). Let one node in 𝐺 be labeled as the altruist 𝛼 . The hospital owning the altruist node is called
the altruist owner and is denoted by 𝑎. We consider an instance to be the base graph together with
node ownership, the value of 𝑝 , and the identity of the altruist.
Each hospital 𝑖 reports a subset 𝑉 ′𝑖 ⊆ 𝑉𝑖 to the mechanism. If 𝑉 ′𝑖 = 𝑉𝑖 , we say that 𝑖 reports
truthfully. The mechanism then learns about all edges in the subgraph of 𝐺 induced by
⋃
𝑉 ′𝑖 ,
which means that the mechanism knows this subgraph, node ownership and the identity of the
altruist,
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but does not have access to the remaining nodes and edges, to whether edges are random
or deterministic, and to the value of 𝑝 . Based on this knowledge, the mechanism selects a (simple)
path starting at the altruist.
Let the length |𝜋 | of a path 𝜋 be its number of nodes, and let the total length | |𝑃 | | of a set of
vertex-disjoint paths 𝑃 be the sum of their lengths. We say that paths are disjoint when they are
vertex disjoint. We refer to the length of the path produced by the mechanism as the welfare, and
to the number of vertices in this path that belong to a certain hospital as the utility of this hospital.
We say that edges between nodes of the same hospital are internal edges; all other edges are
cross edges. When cross edges are considered as part of a path, we call them hops. A path entirely
consisting of internal edges of hospital 𝑖 is called an internal or 𝑖-internal path, and we refer to the
maximal internal subpaths of a path as the segments of the path.
The welfare of a mechanism can be measured relative to multiple benchmarks, all of whom we
define on the full compatibility graph (rather than just the base graph). We define our strongest
benchmark Opt as the longest path starting at the altruist. We also define two weaker benchmarks.
First, for a given 𝑠 , let the long-segments benchmark, SOpt𝒔 , be the longest path from the altruist
such that every segment has at least length 𝑠 , i.e., such that no hop appears too close to another hop,
or to the start or end of the path. Second, for some 𝑠 , let the high-averages benchmark, AvgOpt𝒔 , be
the longest path from the altruist such that each hospital has either no segments in the path, or its
mean segment length is at least 𝑠 . Either of the two weaker benchmarks might not be defined; in
these cases, consider the benchmark as the empty path. Note that, on every compatibility graph, the
total length of AvgOpt𝑠 and SOpt𝑠 is monotone nonincreasing in 𝑠 , and that, for every compatibility
graph and for every 𝑠 , | |SOpt𝑠 | | ≤ | |AvgOpt𝑠 | | ≤ | |Opt | |.
We search for a mechanism that, with high probability over the random edges of a given instance,
satisifies the following desiderata:
Efficiency: If all hospitals report truthfully, the welfare of the mechanism is at least a
(
1 − 𝑜 (1)
)
fraction of the welfare of a given benchmark.
6
For well-definedness, we assume that the altruist is always reported (𝛼 ∈ 𝑉 ′𝑎 ). This is without loss of generality: If the
altruist is hidden, the mechanism cannot output anything and, thus, no hospital can receive more utility from the mechanism.
The more promising strategy of using the altruist for internal matching rather than bringing it to the mechanism will be
captured by the definition of matching-time incentive compatibility even without hiding nodes.
Incentive Compatibility: If all hospitals report truthfully except for hospital 𝑖 , 𝑖’s utility from
the path produced by the mechanism is at most a
(
1 + 𝑜 (1)
)
fraction of its utility when all
hospitals report truthfully.
Individual Rationality: Under truthful reports, the utility of the altruist owner is always at least
a
(
1 − 𝑜 (1)
)
fraction of the length of its longest internal path 𝜋IR starting at the altruist.
Matching-Time Incentive Compatibility: As for regular incentive compatibility, let 𝜋 be the
path produced by the mechanism when all hospitals except for possibly 𝑖 report truthfully.
Not only must 𝑖’s utility from 𝜋 be at most a
(
1 + 𝑜 (1)
)
fraction of its truthful utility, but the
same must be true for any path 𝜋 ′ created by diverting 𝜋 at one of 𝑖’s nodes 𝑣 into an internal
continuation.
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Note that matching-time incentive compatibility implies incentive compatibility. Matching-time
incentive compatibility also generalizes individual rationality since the altruist owner may obtain
her longest internal path 𝜋IR starting at the altruist by reporting all her nodes and diverting the
path at the altruist into 𝜋IR.
In Section 6, we discuss the effects of alternative modeling choices on our problem.
3 LOWER BOUNDS
In this section, we give lower bounds on the welfare of all mechanisms that are either approximately
individually rational or approximately incentive compatible. For brevity, we present the arguments
for individual rationality here and defer the proofs for incentive compatibility to Appendix A.
Consider any mechanism in which, with high probability, the altruist owner can increase her
utility by at most 𝑜 (𝑛) by dropping out and matching internally.8 If compatibility graphs are worst
case with no added random edges, we show in Section 3.1 that the hypothetical mechanism will fall
short of even our suboptimal benchmarks (even for some 𝑠 ∈ Θ(𝑛)) by a gap in Θ(𝑛) with constant
probability. In Section 3.2, we then show that even with randomness, the hypothetical mechanism
still cannot compete with the welfare of Opt, again by a gap in Θ(𝑛) with constant probability.
The second of these lower bounds illustrates why our positive results can compete with the
suboptimal benchmarks SOpt𝑠 and AvgOpt𝑠 , but not the full Opt. More subtly, these analyses also
show that purely efficiency-maximizing mechanisms can create large incentives for manipulation,
resulting in hospitals being unlikely to participate truthfully or at all. We show in Section 3.3 that, in
instances such as those in Theorem 2, our mechanism actually gives higher utility to each hospital
than the pure welfare maximization after accounting for hospital behavior due to incentives. Finally,
we explain how the lower bound in Theorem 2 guided our choice of suboptimal benchmarks.
3.1 Worst-case graphs
Theorem 1. Let 𝑝 = 0, i.e., suppose that no random edges are added to the worst-case base graph.
For each deterministic mechanism, there exists a family of instances such that, on every instance, the
mechanism will obtain Θ(𝑛) less welfare than SOpt𝑛/4 or violate individual rationality by Θ(𝑛). (Note
that, if the mechanism falls short of SOpt𝑛/4, it also falls short of the stronger benchmarks SOpt𝑠 and
AvgOpt𝑠 for any 𝑠 ≤ 𝑛/4.)
Proof. For any 𝑘 ∈ N≥1, consider the instance given in Fig. 2. Clearly, SOpt𝑛/4 will select the
path of length 3𝑘 = 3/4𝑛. If the mechanism selects a path of length at most 2𝑘 , it falls short of
7
Formally: For some node 𝑣 ∈ 𝑉𝑖 on 𝜋 , write 𝜋 = 𝜋1 𝑣 𝜋2 for the prefix and suffix, and let 𝜋ext be an internal path of
hospital 𝑖 , starting at 𝑣, disjoint from 𝜋1, and not necessarily contained in the nodes reported by 𝑖 . Then, 𝜋
′ = 𝜋1𝜋ext .
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Note that our mechanisms fall into this class of mechanisms because, as we will show, hospitals can gain at most an 𝑜 (1)
fraction of the utility obtained under truthful reporting by manipulating, and because the utility obtained under truthful
reporting is at most 𝑛.






Fig. 2. Without random edges, individu-
ally rational mechanisms cannot compete













Fig. 3. Even with random edges, individually rational mecha-
nisms cannot compete with maximum welfare.
the optimal welfare by at least 𝑘 = 𝑛/4. Else, the path must visit some of hospital 2’s nodes, and
therefore can visit at most 𝑘 nodes in hospital 1. However, hospital 1 is the altruist owner and can
match all her 2𝑘 nodes internally outside of the mechanism. Thus, the mechanism must either fall
short of the welfare of SOpt𝑛/4 by 𝑛/4, or it must give hospital 1 an incentive of at least 𝑛/4 to not
participate in the mechanism. □
Theorem 9 in Appendix A shows an analogous result for incentive compatibility (rather than
individual rationality) with respect to SOpt𝑛/6.
At a high level, the graphs that give rise to these results are problematic because they force
the mechanism to choose between a branch with higher welfare and a branch that satisfies key
individual hospitals (in Theorem 1, the altruist owner), who, if unsatisfied, could remove the high-
welfare option altogether by not participating or hiding critical nodes. Intuitively, our semi-random
model gives positive results because, when 𝑝 is large enough, there are enough non-adversarial
cross-edges for the mechanism to avoid these problematic decision points in the graph. For example,
in the instance in Fig. 2, if random edges allow for the stitching of hospital 1’s 2𝑘-length path
in front of the path of hospital 2, then obtaining high welfare and satisfying hospital 1 become
compatible.
3.2 Competing with Optimal Welfare in the Semi-Random Model
Unfortunately, the low number of random edges we allow for in our model do not entirely prevent
these incompatibilities between incentives and welfare. In particular, within our model, we can
still force the mechanism to make these difficult choices on a “small scale”— that is, between
segments that are so short that we likely cannot stitch them using random edges. These small-scale
choices become a problem for our guarantees in instances where the mechanism must make them
repeatedly. We use this observation in the proof of Theorem 2 to construct instances in which our
mechanism cannot compete with Opt while maintaining individual rationality. The corresponding
result for incentive compatibility is shown by Theorem 10 in Appendix A.
Theorem 2. Fix any 𝑝 ∈ 𝑜 (1/𝑛) and any deterministic mechanism. Then, there exists a family of
instances such that, with Ω(1) probability, the mechanism will on each instance either obtain Θ(𝑛)
less welfare than Opt or violate individual rationality by Θ(𝑛) .
Proof. For any 𝑘 ∈ N≥1, consider the base graph of size 8𝑘 + 1 in Fig. 3. Even relying only on
deterministic edges, there is always a path of length 6𝑘 + 1, which can be obtained by branching
into hospital 2’s subgraph in every block (𝑘 times one node from hospital 1 and three nodes from
hospital 2) and going through both segments of length 𝑘 at the end.
Observe that the number of random edges added to this base graph is binomially distributed
with success probability 𝑝 and at most 𝑛2 trials. With probability 1/2, the number of random edges
is at most its rounded expectation, which is less than 𝑝 𝑛2 + 1 ∈ 𝑜 (𝑛). We therefore condition on
the assumption that the number of random edges is at most 𝑝 𝑛2 + 1 for the remainder of the proof.
If the mechanism matches at most 11/4𝑘 of hospital 1’s nodes with probability at least 1/2, then
with total probability 1/4 there is an incentive of at least 3𝑘 + 1 − 11/4𝑘 = 𝑘/4 + 1 ≥ 𝑛/32 for
hospital 1 to match outside of the mechanism, concluding the proof of this case.
Else, we additionally condition on the event of more than 11/4𝑘 of hospital 1’s nodes being
matched. At least 7/4𝑘 of these nodes must lie within the blocks. For the sake of contradiction,
assume that the mechanism obtains welfare of at least (6 − 1/4) 𝑘 + 1 = 23/4𝑘 + 1. Then, at least
15/4𝑘 nodes must be matched within the blocks. Since there are 𝑜 (𝑛) random edges in total, at
most 𝑜 (𝑛) blocks have some incoming random edge. Call the number of these blocks 𝑏. In each of
the 𝑘 − 𝑏 remaining blocks, the mechanism has to decide between the upper and lower branch, i.e.,
it cannot take more than one of hospital 1’s nodes while taking more than 3 nodes in total. Let ℓ be
the number of blocks in which the upper branch is chosen. Since at least 7/4𝑘 of hospital 1’s nodes
are matched, it must hold that (𝑏 + ℓ) 3 + (𝑘 − 𝑏 − ℓ) 1 ≥ 7/4𝑘 , and thus that ℓ ≥ 3/8𝑘 − 𝑏. Since at
least 15/4𝑘 nodes are matched in total, it must hold that 𝑏 6 + ℓ 3 + (𝑘 − 𝑏 − ℓ) 4 ≥ 15/4𝑘 and thus
that ℓ ≤ 1/4𝑘 + 2𝑏. Since 𝑏 ∈ 𝑜 (𝑛) = 𝑜 (𝑘), for large 𝑛, these inequalities are in contradiction. We
conclude that, with total probability at least 1/4, welfare is at least 𝑘/4 lower than 6𝑘 + 1, which is
a lower bound on the length of Opt. □
3.3 Discussion of Lower Bounds
In the previous two sections, we have shown that both individual rationality and incentive compat-
ibility imply that a mechanism has to match substantially fewer nodes than the longest feasible
path. It is natural to wonder whether these incentive properties are worth the loss in welfare.
However, if strong incentives push hospitals towards deviation, the cost to welfare can be
significantly higher. Indeed, the example in Fig. 3 illustrates that maximizing welfare without
concern for incentives can lead to lower welfare than is given by our mechanisms. By reasoning
similar to that used in Theorem 2, a welfare-maximizing mechanism will (with high probability)
give the altruist owner Θ(𝑛) incentive to match outside of the mechanism, giving the altruist owner
utility 3𝑘 + 1 and hospital 2 utility 0. By contrast, one can verify that, for 𝑠 ≤ (𝑛 − 1)/8, both
mechanisms that we develop in this paper (with high probability) choose a path giving the altruist
owner utility in
(
4 − 𝑜 (1)
)
𝑘 and hospital 2 utility in
(
1 − 𝑜 (1)
)
𝑘 . Except for 𝑜 (𝑛) nodes more or
fewer, this path will visit all of hospital 1’s nodes in the blocks, and all the nodes in the 𝑘-length
segments of both hospitals. Thus, using our mechanisms rather than naïve welfare maximization
benefits both hospitals in this situation.
In the rest of this section, we explain why we consider the long-segments and high-averages
benchmarks to be natural responses to the lower bound in Theorem 2. We start with the simple
observation that, in our semi-random model, it is advantageous for a hospital to have long internal
paths. This is because long internal paths are more likely to have cross-edges that are “useful” to the
mechanism— that is, cross-edges that the mechanism could use to increase overall welfare. When a
hospital has useful cross-edges to and from its internal paths, the mechanism will incorporate many
of the hospital’s nodes into a high-welfare path, an outcome which gives utility to the hospital
while increasing overall welfare, thereby aligning the objectives of this hospital and the mechanism.
Unfortunately, long internal paths do not guarantee a hospital high utility in the mechanism,
because a hospital’s long paths give it utility only to the extent that the mechanism can use them to
create welfare. This problem arises in the example in Fig. 3, in which hospital 1 has a long internal
path, but yet ends up getting Ω(𝑛) less utility than it would receive by leaving the mechanism
altogether. What happens to hospital 1 in this example illustrates the broader problem addressed
by our benchmarks: to even approximate maximum welfare, the mechanism’s path must use many
short segments of hospital 1’s internal path, leaving the remainder chopped into pieces that are
(with high probability) too short to be stitched in later. For each of these short segments, then,
hospital 1 gains little utility (one node) while losing a comparable amount of potential utility (2
nodes). By this reasoning, any path with welfare close to Opt is unacceptable to hospital 1, which
would be better off matching its internal path outside of the mechanism.
Our benchmark SOpt𝑠 addresses this problem by enforcing that, for each hospital, all their
segments in the path have length at least 𝑠 . We will choose 𝑠 to be much larger than the maximum
amount of nodes on a long path that might become useless for stitching due to a single segment. By
the reasoning above, this restriction guarantees that the utility each hospital gains from segments
included in themechanism’s path outweighs the potential loss in stitchable paths. The high-averages
benchmark AvgOpt𝑠 is based on a slightly more refined version of the argument for SOpt𝑠 , which
recognizes the fact that it suffices if the utility from all segments outweighs the losses afflicted by
all segments, rather than each segment paying off individually. Obviously, there exist base graphs
on which obtaining more utility than our benchmarks would not be in conflict with incentives.
However, our benchmarks allow us to make a welfare guarantee for all base graphs, which should
be high for graphs with long internal paths and ensures that the mechanism makes use of a wide
range of opportunities for matching between hospitals.
4 A SIMPLE INCENTIVE-COMPATIBLE MECHANISM
It remains to show that we indeed can compete with the high-averages benchmark while providing
matching-time incentive compatibility. To build intuition for the full result, we begin with a simple
mechanism, which only satisfies traditional incentive compatibility (but not individual rationality
and matching-time incentive compatibility) and only competes with the long-segments benchmark.
Designing mechanisms would be fairly easy if our graphs were Erdős-Rényi style graphs with
high edge probability, because the mechanism could simply construct a path including essentially
all nodes, and no hospital would have an incentive to deviate. Unfortunately, the low probability
with which our random edges appear prevents us from applying this idea. Instead, suppose that, for
each hospital 𝑖 , we fix a set Paths𝑖 , which contains disjoint 𝑖-internal paths that have length much
larger than 2 𝑠 ′′ for some 𝑠 ′′. Then, consider these paths as the nodes in a meta graph, where the
meta graph has an edge between nodes 𝜋1 and 𝜋2 iff 𝐺 has an edge from one of the last 𝑠
′′
nodes
of path 𝜋1 to one of the first 𝑠
′′
nodes of path 𝜋2. Thus, edges in the meta graph exist whenever
at least one of the 𝑠 ′′2 potential random edges between 𝜋1 and 𝜋2 exists in 𝐺 . These edges occur
independently between meta edges and with probability 1 − (1 − 𝑝)𝑠′′2 . Therefore, if 𝑠 ′′ is large
enough, the meta graph will be densely connected, and we will be able to stitch all paths in 𝐺 into
a single long path.
The mechanism built from these intuitions is shown in Mechanism 1. It takes in the reported
graph including node ownership and the identity of the altruist and a parameter 𝑠 . Recall that the
altruist owner is denoted by 𝑎.
Initially, the mechanism defines for each hospital 𝑖 a set Paths𝑖 of disjoint 𝑖-internal paths of
equal length 𝑠 ′ ≫ 2 𝑠 ′′ (line 5). The main complication standing in the way of stitching⋃𝑖 Paths𝑖 is
that random edges only allow for the stitching of paths in different hospitals. Thus, no hospital can
contribute more than half (rounded up for 𝑎) of all paths in
⋃
𝑖 Paths𝑖 . To deal with this constraint,
in line 7, the mechanism redefines Paths 𝑗 for the hospital with the largest number of paths such
that the hospital now has at most as many paths as all other hospitals combined (plus one, for 𝑎). In
line 8, the mechanism orders all paths in
⋃
𝑖 Paths𝑖 in a sequence such that the path owners alternate.
Mechanism 1: Long-segments mechanism
input : reported graph of size 𝑛 ≫ 1, parameter 𝑠 ≫ log(𝑛)2
output : success indicator, path 𝜋
1 𝑠 ′ ← 𝑠/log𝑛, 𝑠 ′′ ← 𝑠/log(𝑛)2
2 if  internal path of length 𝑠 ′ from 𝛼 then
3 return “success”, minimum path {𝛼}
4 foreach hospital 𝑖 do
5 Paths𝑖 ← largest set of disjoint 𝑖-internal paths each of length exactly 𝑠 ′; for 𝑖 = 𝑎, one path must
start at 𝛼 .
6 𝑗 ← argmax𝑖 |Paths𝑖 |, break ties by hospital id.
7 Paths 𝑗 ← set of disjoint 𝑗-internal paths of max. total length subject to (1) the number of paths being at
least max𝑖≠𝑗 |Paths𝑖 | and at most
∑
𝑖≠𝑗 |Paths𝑖 | + 1{ 𝑗 = 𝑎}, (2) all paths having size ≥ 𝑠 ′, and (3) if 𝑗 = 𝑎,
one path starting at 𝛼 .
8 order the paths
⋃
𝑖 Paths𝑖 in a hospital-alternating sequence such that the path starting at 𝛼 is the first in
the sequence.
9 check if paths can be stitched in order by finding an edge from the last 𝑠 ′′ nodes of the 𝑡 th path in the
sequence to the first 𝑠 ′′ nodes of the (𝑡 + 1)th path for all 𝑡 .
10 if this stitching succeeds then
11 return “success”, stitched path 𝜋
12 else
13 return “failure”, minimum path {𝛼}
We will show further below that this is always possible by applying the following combinatorial
lemma, whose proof we defer to Appendix B:
Lemma 3. Let there be a finite number of balls with colors in [𝑐], such that there are 𝑛1 ≥ 𝑛2 ≥
· · · ≥ 𝑛𝑐 many balls of each color. If 𝑛1 ≤
∑
𝑖≥2 𝑛𝑖 , the balls can be arranged in a cyclical sequence
such that no two adjacent balls have the same color. In particular, they can be ordered in a linear,
color-alternating sequence such that an arbitrary ball can be chosen as the first.
For our choices of parameters, we will show that, with high probability, the meta graph will be
so dense that the chosen order of
⋃
𝑖 Paths𝑖 forms a path in the meta graph, which means that the
paths in
⋃
𝑖 Paths𝑖 can be stitched in order. Assuming that this stitching succeeds, the stitched path
is returned in line 11; in the low-probability event of failure, the mechanism returns in line 12.
We now comment on the well-definedness of Mechanism 1. In line 1, we ignore the rounding of
𝑠 ′ and 𝑠 ′′. Since we assume 𝑠 to be large, this does not influence the asymptotics of our analysis. The
check in line 2 ensures that line 5 is well-defined. Line 7 is well-defined because an appropriately
chosen subset
9
of the original Paths 𝑗 satisfies the requirements. For line 8, we need to show that
such an ordering exists. If |Paths 𝑗 | ≤
∑
𝑖≠𝑗 |Paths𝑖 |, Lemma 3 directly gives us a sequence. Else, by
line 7, it must be that 𝑗 = 𝑎 and |Paths 𝑗 | =
∑
𝑖≠𝑗 |Paths𝑖 | + 1. Then, Lemma 3 allows to order all paths
in
⋃
𝑖 Paths𝑖 except for the one starting at 𝛼10 such that the sequence starts with a hospital other
than the altruist owner. Then, adding the altruist path to the front of the sequence will produce a
valid hospital-alternating sequence. Finally, in line 9, for large 𝑛, note that 𝑠 ′ = log𝑛 𝑠 ′′ ≫ 2 𝑠 ′′, so
that the nodes used for stitching into and out of a path do not overlap.
With these things out of the way, our theorem is the following:
9




that includes the path
starting at 𝛼 .
10
If the path starting at 𝛼 is the only path in
⋃
𝑖 Paths𝑖 , an ordering exists trivially.
Theorem 4. Let there be at least two hospitals, and let 𝑠, 𝑝 be parameters varying in 𝑛 such that




. Then, for any sequence of instances with such 𝑛 and 𝑝 , running Mechanism 1
on the full graph succeeds with high probability. In this case, call the resulting path 𝜋 . It must hold
that |𝜋 | ≥
(
1 − 𝑜 (1)
)
|SOpt𝑠 | and, by hiding vertices, any hospital 𝑖 can receive at most utility(
1 + 𝑜 (1)
)
|𝜋 ∩𝑉𝑖 | from the mechanism.
To prove this theorem, we show in the following lemmas that the mechanism indeed succeeds
on the truthful graph with high probability (Lemma 5), that it achieves high welfare in this case
(Lemma 6), and that, if the mechanism succeeds on the truthful graph, manipulation can only
increase utility by lower-order term (Lemma 7).




, Mechanism 1 succeeds
with high probability under truthful reports.
Proof. If the branch in line 2 is taken, the mechanism succeeds deterministically. Else, it will get
to line 9. Even if we only consider the random edges, each individual stitching fails with probability
at most (1 − 𝑝) (𝑠′′)2 . Adding the deterministic edges can only decrease this probability. Using a
union bound over at most 𝑛 paths, we conclude that the stitching— and thus the mechanism— fails
with probability at most
𝑛 (1 − 𝑝)𝑠′′2 ≤ exp(log𝑛 − 𝑝 𝑠2/log(𝑛)4) → 0. □




. Whenever Mechanism 1 succeeds on the truthful reports, it
achieves welfare of at least
(
1 − 𝑜 (1)
)
|SOpt𝑠 |.
Proof. Assuming that all hospitals are truthful, consider the path SOpt𝑠 . In lines 4 and 5, every
path segment in SOpt𝑠 of length ℓ ≥ 𝑠 could be cut up into ⌊ℓ/𝑠 ′⌋ ≥ ℓ/𝑠 ′ − 1 ≥ (1 − 1/log𝑛) ℓ/𝑠 ′
disjoint paths of length 𝑠 ′, which means that Paths𝑖 must contain at least (1−1/log𝑛) |SOpt𝑠 ∩𝑉𝑖 |/𝑠 ′
many paths. Thus, the total length of each set Paths𝑖 is at least (1 − 1/log𝑛) |SOpt𝑠 ∩𝑉𝑖 |.
Some additional reasoning is needed to show that the same remains true after Paths 𝑗 is redefined
in line 7. Namely,
∑
𝑖≠𝑗 |Paths𝑖 | + 1{ 𝑗 = 𝑎} could be lower than the number of 𝑠 ′′-length paths
needed to cover a (1 − 1/log𝑛) fraction of nodes in 𝑗 ’s segments in SOpt𝑠 . Suppose that this is the
case, and let SOpt𝑠 contain 𝑟 many segments in total.
Suppose for now that 𝑗 ≠ 𝑎. Then, hospital 𝑗 cannot have owned more than 𝑟/2 of the segments
in SOpt𝑠 since the ownership alternates between segments and the altruist owns the first segment.
By the reasoning of the first paragraph of this proof, the at least 𝑟/2 many segments belonging
to other hospitals mean that the Paths𝑖 for all 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 together contain at least log𝑛 𝑟/2 many paths,
which, for large 𝑛, is larger than 𝑟/2. Then, the redefinition of Paths 𝑗 in line 5 permits at least 𝑟/2
paths of minimum length 𝑠 ′, which allows to cover all nodes in SOpt𝑠 ∩𝑉𝑗 .
Else, i.e., if 𝑗 = 𝑎, essentially the same reasoning applies. Hospital 𝑗 cannot have owned more than
⌈𝑟/2⌉ of the segments in SOpt𝑠 , and the Paths𝑖 for 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 will together contain at least log𝑛 ⌊𝑟/2⌋
paths. For large 𝑛, this number is at least ⌈𝑟/2⌉ − 1, which means that the redefinition of Paths 𝑗
allows for at least ⌈𝑟/2⌉ paths; again, all nodes in 𝑗 ’s segments of SOpt𝑠 could be covered by a set
of paths satisfying the constraints in the redefinition of Paths 𝑗 . Thus, whether 𝑗 = 𝑎 or not, the
total length of Paths 𝑗 continues to be at least (1 − 1/log𝑛) |SOpt𝑠 ∩𝑉𝑗 |.
Through the stitching process, the length of each path in
⋃
𝑖 Paths𝑖 (which has size at at least
𝑠 ′) might decrease by up to 2 𝑠 ′′, so each hospital 𝑖 receives utility of at least (1 − 2/log𝑛) (1 −
1/log𝑛) |SOpt𝑠∩𝑉𝑖 | ≥ (1−3/log𝑛) |SOpt𝑠∩𝑉𝑖 | from the returned path. Adding up over all hospitals,
it follows that the social welfare is at least a (1 − 3/log𝑛) fraction of |SOpt𝑠 |. □
Lemma 7. Again, suppose that 𝑠 ∈ 𝜔 (log(𝑛)2). Assuming that Mechanism 1 succeeds under truthful
reports and returns a path 𝜋 , each hospital can only gain
(
1 + 𝑜 (1)
)
|𝜋 ∩𝑉𝑖 | utility by hiding vertices.
Proof. If the mechanism returns a trivial path in line 3 under truthful reporting, hiding nodes
cannot change this outcome. If a manipulation causes the mechanism to return in lines 3 or 13, the
mechanism returns a subpath of the truthful path, and no hospital can gain from this manipulation.
We may thus assume that the mechanism successfully returns in line 11 under truthful reports and
only consider maniplations that make the mechanism return in line 11 as well.
First, consider a hospital 𝑖 who cannot form enough paths of length 𝑠 ′ in line 5 to become
the special hospital 𝑗 . Let 𝑟 be the number of paths in Paths𝑖 under truthful reporting. Since the
mechanism succeeded, truthful reporting guarantees a utility of at least 𝑟 (𝑠 ′ − 2 𝑠 ′′) to hospital 𝑖 .
Since no manipulation can increase the number of chosen paths in Paths𝑖 and since only nodes
in
⋃
𝑖 Paths𝑖 can end up in a stitched path, the possible utility is bounded above by 𝑟 𝑠 ′ = 1/(1 −
2/log𝑛) 𝑟 (𝑠 ′ − 2 𝑠 ′′). Thus, the benefits of manipulation are of lower order.
Second, consider a hospital 𝑗 who, under truthful reporting, will have the highest number of
paths. Fix the updated Paths 𝑗 under truthful reporting. If a manipulation by 𝑗 does not change the
fact that the hospital is chosen as 𝑗 in line 6, any such manipulation can only reduce the total size
of Paths 𝑗 in line 7. Again, such a change can only be advantageous in terms of the stitching loss,
which is lower-order as above.
If, however, the manipulation turns this hospital into one of the hospitals 𝑖 who are not chosen in
line 6, the manipulation must lead to Paths𝑖 as chosen in line 5 containing at most max𝑖′≠𝑖 |Paths𝑠𝑖 |
paths. Thus, Paths𝑖 contains fewer paths than the updated Paths 𝑗 under truthful reporting, and
each path has smaller length. It follows that the total length of Paths𝑖 decreases in the manipulation,
which means that the hospital may at most gain lower-order utility from a more advantageous
stitching. □
Note that, when we defined 𝑠 ′ as 𝑠/log𝑛 and 𝑠 ′′ as 𝑠/log𝑛, any other function 𝑓 (𝑛) ∈ 𝜔 (1) could
have replaced the logarithm. By choosing a function 𝑓 that grows very slowly, the precondition of
Theorem 4 can be slightly weakened to lim𝑛→∞ 𝑝 𝑠2/𝑓 (𝑛)4 − log𝑛 →∞.
5 MATCHING-TIME INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY WITH HIGHERWELFARE
As we showed in the previous section, Mechanism 1 guarantees incentive compatibility while
competing with the long-segments benchmark in terms of welfare. While this positive result is
encouraging, we would like to strengthen both the incentive properties and the efficiency of our
mechanism. Before explaining our stronger Mechanism 2 in more detail, we explain why these
properties are needed and how we modify the original mechanism to obtain them.
5.1 Strengthening Mechanism 1: Desiderata and Changes
Stronger notions of incentive compatibility. Mechanism 1 guarantees incentive compatibility, i.e.,
that hiding nodes cannot increase a hospital’s utility from the path returned by the mechanism.
Unfortunately, it is not clear that the real path of transplantations will be what the mechanism
suggests. Indeed, at any point in the execution of the transplantation chain, a hospital might pretend
that the chain ended at one of its vertices because the donor reneged, and then use the donated
kidney to makemore internal matches. Even without such foul play, the lack of individual rationality
in Mechanism 1 might disincentivize the altruist owner from participating in the mechanism.
Clearly, to satisfy individual rationality, the mechanism must be more generous to the altruist
owner than in line 3 of Mechanism 1, choosing a long internal path instead of just the altruist.
Mechanism 2 does so, most relevantly in lines 6 and 27, where 𝜋IR, the longest internal path starting
at the altruist, is returned.
More importantly, while the requirement in Mechanism 1 that all paths in Paths𝑖 for 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 have
fixed length 𝑠 ′ is convenient for analysis, it can incentivize hospitals to divert the path at the end of
Mechanism 2: High-averages mechanism
input : reported graph of size 𝑛 ≫ 1, parameter 𝑠 ≫ log(𝑛)2
output : success indicator, path 𝜋
1 𝑠 ′ ← 𝑠/log(𝑛)2
2 foreach hospital 𝑖 do
3 paths𝑖 ← log𝑛×max. number of disj. 𝑖-internal paths such that average path length ≥ 𝑠 .
4 say that hospitals 𝑖 with paths𝑖 > 0 are active.
5 if 𝑎 inactive or if only 𝑎 is active then
6 return “success”, 𝜋IR
7 𝑗 ← argmax𝑖 |Paths𝑖 |, break ties by hospital id.
8 paths 𝑗 ← min(paths 𝑗 ,
∑
𝑖≠𝑗 paths𝑖 )
9 foreach active hospital 𝑖 do
10 Paths𝑖 ← set of up to paths𝑖 disjoint 𝑖-internal paths of maximum total length.
11 from each Paths𝑖 , remove all paths of length less than 4 𝑠 ′
12 foreach active hospital 𝑖 do
13 repeat paths𝑖 − |Paths𝑖 | times
14 split a suffix of length 4 𝑠 ′ off the end of longest path in Paths𝑖 ; add to Paths𝑖 .
15 Exp← ∅, a ← 𝛼
16 do {
17 Exp← Exp ∪ {a}
18 if a lies on some 𝜋 ∈ ⋃𝑖 Paths𝑖 then
19 𝜎 ← the suffix of 𝜋 starting at a
20 remove 𝜎 from 𝜋
21 if |𝜎 | ≥ 𝑠 ′ then
22 return stitch1()
23 else
24 Exp← Exp ∪ 𝜎
25 } while (|Exp | < 𝑠 ′ and can successfully set a to some node in an active hospital such that 𝑥 → a is an edge,
𝑥 ∈ Exp, and a ∉ Exp)
26 if |Exp | < 𝑠 ′ then
27 return “success”, 𝜋IR
28 else if some neighbor of 𝑣 ∈ Exp is in first 𝑠 ′ nodes of some 𝜋 ∈ ⋃𝑖 Paths𝑖 then
29 return stitch2()
30 else
31 return “failure”, 𝜋IR
their last segment to extend the length of the segment. To address this shortcoming of Mechanism 1,
our new mechanism must be more flexible in how it selects the Paths𝑖 , perhaps in a way that more
closely resembles the redefinition of Paths 𝑗 in line 7 of Mechanism 1. However, while allowing for
a wider range of Paths𝑖 , we still need to ensure that we can stitch the resulting paths, i.e., that all
paths in
⋃
𝑖 Paths𝑖 have a certain minimum length, and that no hospital has more paths than all
other hospitals combined. Mechanism 2 accomplishes this by first determining a number of paths
paths𝑖 for each hospital 𝑖 (lines 2, 3, 7 and 8). It then initializes Paths𝑖 by selecting up to paths𝑖 paths
in a way that maximizes the total length of this set without any further constraints (line 10), and
modifies Paths𝑖 afterwards to make sure that its paths have an adequate minimum length and that
Procedure stitch1
1 𝜎 ′ ← path from 𝛼 through Exp to a , then 𝜎
2 let ⟨𝜋, 𝜋2, . . . , 𝜋𝑟 ⟩ be a hospital-alternating ordering of
⋃
𝑖 Paths𝑖 starting at 𝜋 such that the owner of 𝜋𝑟 is
not the owner of 𝜋 .
3 if |𝜋 | < 2 𝑠 ′ then
4 seq← ⟨𝜎 ′, 𝜋2, . . . , 𝜋𝑟 ⟩
5 else
6 seq← ⟨𝜎 ′, 𝜋2, . . . , 𝜋𝑟 , 𝜋⟩
7 for each 𝑡 , try find an edge between the last 𝑠 ′ nodes in the 𝑡 th path in seq to the first 𝑠 ′ nodes in the
(𝑡 + 1)th path.
8 if this stitching succeeds then
9 return “success”, stitched path
10 else
11 return “failure”, 𝜋IR
Procedure stitch2
1 𝜎 ← the path from 𝛼 through Exp to 𝑣
2 arrange
⋃
𝑖 Paths𝑖 in hospital-alternating sequence starting with 𝜋 .
3 try to stitch the sequence of paths in order, using up to 𝑠 ′ nodes each time; add the already established
stitch between 𝜎 and 𝜋 to the front.
4 if this stitching succeeds then
5 return “success”, stitched path
6 else
7 return “failure”, 𝜋IR
their number is exactly paths𝑖 (lines 11 to 14). We will have to show that this always succeeds on
large enough graphs, and that welfare and incentives are preserved.
Higher welfare. On the welfare side, a severe limitation of Mechanism 1 is that, whenever the
altruist is not at the start of an internal path of length at least 𝑠 ′, the mechanism returns a trivial
path. This shortcoming is reflected in the benchmark SOpt𝑠 , which is also trivial in these cases. On
the one hand, the lack of welfare in these scenarios is understandable because random edges can no
longer reliably connect the altruist to long paths in other hospitals. On the other hand, there might
be deterministic cross edges that can play this role, possibly going back and forth between different
hospitals for a while before reaching long paths. If the altruist has great connectivity to paths, but
these paths happen to be in other hospitals’ subgraphs, we would still like our mechanism to make
use of this connectivity. The high-average benchmark AvgOpt𝑠 is a way to capture this potential.
In particular, it allows the number of segments in each hospital to be arbitrarily high as long as
some of these segments are long enough to make the stitching worthwhile, as we discussed in
Section 3.3.
In contrast to Mechanism 1, no path in
⋃
𝑖 Paths𝑖 has to start at the altruist in Mechanism 2.
Thus, rather than stitching immediately, Mechanism 2 starts a graph search (from line 15 onward),
which explores nodes reachable from the altruist until it finds a node that exists on a path in the
set of predetermined paths
⋃
𝑖 Paths𝑖 . Not only is this node required to lie on a predetermined
path, however; it also must also be far enough from the end of its predetermined path that, with
high probability, we can stitch in another path after it. If this search successfully finds a node on a
predetermined path 𝜋 , its suffix and prefix might get stitched in separately. Since a matching-time
manipulation could exploit this fact to visit a (paths𝑖 + 1)th path, all nonzero paths𝑖 must be chosen
large enough in line 3 that a single additional path gains only lower-order amounts of utility.
Another complication is that this graph search cannot explore too many nodes because, if the
initial path becomes too long, its contribution to some hospitals’ utility might no longer be lower-
order. As a result, hospitals might hide nodes to force the graph search to succeed later, which
might increase the length of this initial path. To counter this, the mechanism returns with a failure
in line 31 if the search is unsuccessful after exploring more than 𝑠 ′ nodes. Fortunately, this failure
mode is unlikely to happen under truthful reports due to the random edges. Additional cases we
consider are those in which the search reaches a node on a path, but that node is too close to its
end to start stitching (line 24), or if too few nodes are reachable from the altruist (line 27).
5.2 Main Result
We can now state our main result in full:
Theorem 8. Let there be at least two hospitals, and let 𝑠, 𝑝 be parameters varying in 𝑛 such that




. Then, for any sequence of instances with such 𝑛 and 𝑝 , running Mechanism 2
under truthful reports succeeds with high probability. In this case, call the resulting path 𝜋 . Then, it
must hold that |𝜋 | ≥
(
1 − 𝑜 (1)
)
|AvgOpt𝑠 | and that, by any manipulation captured by matching-time
incentive compatibility, 𝑖 can receive at most utility
(
1 + 𝑜 (1)
)
|𝜋 ∩𝑉𝑖 |.
The proof of this theorem is deferred to Appendix C. There, we begin by going through the steps
of the algorithm, which also serves to show that Mechanism 2 is well defined. These observations
then enable us to prove that Mechanism 2 succeeds with high probability (Lemma 11), obtains high
welfare (Lemma 12), and is matching-time incentive compatible (Lemma 13). Taken together, these
lemmas establish our main theorem.
6 ALTERNATIVE MODELING ASSUMPTIONS
As is often the case in the design of semi-random models, there is a range of alternatives to the
modeling choices we made in Section 2. In this section, we discuss how some of these alternative
assumptions would affect our mechanism-design problem.
For example, our model allows hospitals to hide nodes but not individual edges, a standard
assumption in the existing kidney literature [1, 4, 7, 19, 26]. In fact, however, our proofs of Lemmas 7
and 13 immediately go through even if hospitals can hide not only their nodes but also internal
edges and cross edges adjacent to their nodes. It follows that our mechanisms retain the same
guarantees in this stronger model.
Additionally, we restricted our model to a single altruist and thus a single path, which simplifies
the notation andmakes the algorithmic problemmore natural. For appropriate generalizations of the
benchmark and matching-time incentive compatibility, we believe that Mechanism 2 and Theorem 8
can be extended to multiple altruists.
Concerning the use of semi-randomness, adversarial and random steps can be combined in many
ways.
11
For a fixed set of nodes, fixed node ownership, a fixed altruist, and a fixed probability 𝑝 , we
can partition our semi-random model into four stages:
(1) “I”: The adversary adds internal edges.
(2) “A”: The adversary adds cross edges.
(3) “R”: Random cross edges are added with probability 𝑝 .
11
This is similar to work the work of Kolla et al. [22], who show how, in the context of unique games, four different models
arise from adding randomness in different phases.
(4) “B”: The efficiency benchmarks are computed.
The 24 permutations of the four phases “I”, “A”, “R”, and “B” define different semi-random models,
which we will discuss exhaustively. Note that some of these permutations define equivalent models
since, if the adversarial phases “I” and “A” are adjacent, their relative order does not matter.
Furthermore, we are only interested in models where the benchmark (phase “B”) is computed after
the internal edges and at least some cross edges are inserted.
Among the remaining models, there are some (“ARIB”, “RIAB”, “RIBA”) in which the adversary
can add internal edges adaptively to the random cross edges. Assume that each hospital owns Ω(𝑛)
vertices and that 𝑝 ∈ 𝑜 (1/𝑛). Then, in these semi-random models, the adversary can (with high
probability) create variants of the worst-case instances in Fig. 2, effectively removing the benefit
we get from randomness. Indeed, with high probability, the altruist does not have random outgoing
edges, only a vanishing fraction of each hospital’s nodes have random edges, and there exists an
isolated cross edge from the altruist owner to another hospital. If this is the case, the adversary
can build the internal paths using only nodes without random edges, and can use the isolated
random cross edge to replicate the shape of the worst-case example. As a result, any mechanism
that competes with SOpt𝑐 ·𝑛 in welfare12 cannot give individual rationality or incentive compatibility
with high probability. Because the argument used no adversarial cross edges, it equally applies to
“ARIB”, “RIAB”, and “RIBA”.
Perhaps the most interesting variant of our semi-random model is “IRAB”, which differs from
our model in that the adversarial cross edges may depend on the random cross edges. Note that this
model is more general than ours and that our lower bounds apply as a result. Since Mechanism 1
does not consider the existence of cross edges at all before choosing which path to stitch, adversarial
cross edges can only increase the probability of success, which means that Theorem 4 continues to
hold. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said about Mechanism 2, which considers cross edges in
the graph search. By adaptively adding cross edges, an adversary could guide the graph search into
parts of the graph where stitching will fail. While a version of Mechanism 2 without the graph
search can guarantee matching-time incentive compatibility for the long-segments benchmark, we
do not have results for the high-averages benchmark in this alternative model.
The two remaining models, “IABR” and “IRBA”, are variants of our main model and “IRAB”,
respectively. In these variants, the benchmark is computed not on the full compatibility graph, but
on the graph with either the random or adversarial cross edges still missing. Because the welfare
attained by these benchmarks will be lower than on the full graph, positive results immediately
carry over. Since the proof of Theorem 2 did not make use of the fact that the optimal benchmark
might increase due to random edges, this lower bound also applies to “IABR”.
7 DISCUSSION
For studying themechanism-design problem of finding long chains in kidney exchange, we proposed
a semi-random model for compatibility graphs. Since this model only assumes the existence of a
very low number of random edges, this assumption can be seen as a mild regularity condition on the
compatibility graph. In this semi-random model, we developed mechanisms that limit incentives for
manipulation to lower-order terms while competing with strong benchmarks in terms of welfare.
We do not claim that the mechanisms designed in this paper are ready for use in practice. Whether
they are depends on questions not yet investigated: whether the asymptotic guarantees have traction
in graphs of typical size, whether hospitals can be convinced to report their pairs truthfully despite
possible lower-order gains from manipulation, and whether the high-averages benchmark gets
reasonably close to the optimal welfare on practical kidney-exchange graphs. Moreover, our model
12
For a small enough constant 𝑐 > 0, depending on the number of nodes per hospital.
abstracts from crucial aspects of the practical problem, including the existence of multiple chains
and the fact that practical compatibility graphs evolve dynamically while transplantations on the
chain are executed.
Thus, rather than proposing a complete solution, we hope that our work can serve as a stepping
stone for future mechanisms coordinating kidney exchange with altruist-initiated chains. Specif-
ically, we have demonstrated that, despite the ubiquitous impossibilities of this setting, kidney
exchange with donor chains is a valid target for mechanism design— as long as one is willing to
trade traditional worst-case analysis for beyond worst-case methodologies.
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APPENDIX
A LOWER BOUNDS FOR INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY
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Fig. 5. Even with random edges, incentive compatible mechanisms cannot compete with Opt.
A.1 Worst-case graphs
Theorem 9. Let 𝑝 = 0, i.e., suppose that no random edges are added to the worst-case base graph.
For each deterministic mechanism, there exists a family of instances such that, on every instance, the
mechanism will obtain Θ(𝑛) less welfare than SOpt𝑛/6 or give some hospital Θ(𝑛) incentive for hiding
nodes.
(Note that, if the mechanism falls short of SOpt𝑛/6, it also falls short of the stronger benchmarks
SOpt𝑠 and AvgOpt𝑠 for any 𝑠 ≤ 𝑛/6.)
Proof. For any 𝑘 ∈ N≥1, consider the instances given in Fig. 4. Depending on the behavior of
the mechanism, we will add either this instance or a slightly modified instance to the family of
instances. We will always add a graph of size in {6𝑘, 6𝑘 − 1}, which means that 𝑛 ∈ Θ(𝑘). Note
that SOpt𝑛/6 selects the path of length 4𝑘 on the full graph.
Under truthful reports, if the mechanism selects less than 2𝑘 of hospital 2’s nodes, it achieves
a welfare of at most 3𝑘 rather than the welfare of 4𝑘 obtained by the benchmark. Thus, the
mechanism obtains a welfare that is at least 𝑘 = 𝑛/6 lower than the one obtained by the benchmark,
and we can add the full instance to the family.
Else, the mechanism selects at least 2𝑘 nodes from hospital 2 under truthful reporting, which
means that hospital 1 receives utility 𝑘 + 1. Now consider the same graph with node 𝑥 removed, on
which SOpt𝑛/6 will obtain a welfare of 3𝑘 , the length of the 𝑎-internal path. If the mechanism takes
at most 2𝑘 nodes when presented with this graph, its welfare is below that of the benchmark by at
least 𝑘 = (𝑛 − 1)/6, and we can add the instance without 𝑥 to the family as above. Else, hospital 1
receives at least 2𝑘 + 1 utility on the smaller graph, and at most 𝑘 + 1 utility on the full graph. Thus,
hospital 1 has an incentive of 𝑘 = 𝑛/6 to hide node 𝑥 when reporting its subgraph. Thus, we add
the full graph to the family. □
A.2 Competing with Optimal Welfare in the Semi-Random Model
Theorem 10. Fix any 𝑝 ∈ 𝑜 (1/𝑛) and any deterministic mechanism. Then, there exists a family of
instances such that, with Ω(1) probability, the mechanism will on any instance either obtain Θ(𝑛) less
welfare than Opt or give some hospital Θ(𝑛) incentive for hiding nodes.
Proof. For any 𝑘 , consider the base graph in Fig. 5 with 6𝑘 nodes. We will always construct a
graph of size either 6𝑘 or 5𝑘 nodes, so 𝑝 ∈ 𝑜 (1/𝑘). Let 𝜖 > 0 be a sufficiently small constant, which
can be set to 1/20.
In each of the random graphs, the maximum welfare is at least 4𝑘 , which can be obtained by not
taking any random edges, and branching into hospital 2’s subgraph whenever possible. Suppose
that, over the randomness in the random edges, the mechanism has in expectation welfare below
(4 − 2 𝜖) 𝑘 . Then, by Markov’s inequality, the probability that welfare is above (4 − 𝜖) 𝑘 is at most
(4−2 𝜖)/(4−𝜖) < 1. We add this base graph to the family, and know that, with constant probability,
the mechanism will achieve 𝜖 𝑘 ∈ Θ(𝑘) = Θ(𝑛) less welfare than the optimal path.
Now consider the same base graph where all the square nodes have been removed. Note that this
reduces 𝑛 by a constant factor and might change 𝑝 , but that this 𝑝 ′ is still in 𝑜 (1/𝑘). Since there are
at most (5𝑘)2 potential edges, each existing independently with probability 𝑝 ′, the distribution of
|𝐸𝑝 | is dominated by a binomial variable with (5𝑘)2 trials and success probability 𝑝 ′. By a Chernoff
bound, the probability that this binomial variable is larger than (5𝑘)2 𝑝 ′ +
√




. Since the square nodes are removed, none of hospital 2’s vertices would be reachable from
the altruist without random edges, and every random edge can make at most 2 additional vertices
reachable. Suppose the expected welfare achieved by the mechanism on the reduced base graph
is below (3 − 2 𝜖) 𝑘 . Then, by Markov, the mechanism can achieve welfare above (3 − 𝜖) 𝑘 with
probability at most (3 − 2 𝜖)/(3 − 𝜖); with probability at least 𝜖 𝑘 ∈ Θ(𝑛), it wastes at least 𝜖 𝑘
welfare with respect to the maximal path of length at least 3𝑘 . Thus, in this case, the reduced base
graph can be added to the family to satisfy the claim. Otherwise, if the expected welfare is above
(3 − 2 𝜖) 𝑘 , at most 𝑒−
√
5𝑘/3
6𝑘 + 𝑜 (𝑘) 2 ∈ 𝑜 (𝑘) of that expectation comes from nodes of hospital 2
and from any nodes in blocks with random edges. Thus, the expected utility for hospital 1 from
non-random blocks is at least (3−3 𝜖) 𝑘 for large enough 𝑘 . Because the random variable describing
this utility can never be larger than 3𝑘 (i.e., hospital 1’s total number of nodes), this utility must be
larger than 8/3𝑘 with probability at least ((3 − 3 𝜖) 𝑘 − 8/3𝑘)/(3𝑘 − 8/3𝑘) = 1 − 9 𝜖 .
Return to the full base graph, knowing that the expected welfare on the whole base graph is least
(4 − 2 𝜖) 𝑘 , and that hospital 1’s utility on the reduced base graph is at least 8/3 with probability at
least 1− 9 𝜖 . Again, a Chernoff bound shows that there must be 𝑜 (𝑘) random edges with probability
at least 1 − 𝑒−
√
6𝑘/3
. For each of block with random edges, its contribution to welfare is at most 6,
and its contribution to hospital 1’s utility is at most 4. All the other blocks can only be entered
once, meaning that they can either provide 4 welfare and 2 utility for hospital 1, or 3 welfare and 3
utility for hospital 1. Let 𝛼 be the expected fraction of blocks that do not have random edges and in




6𝑘 + 𝛼 4𝑘 + (1 − 𝛼) 3𝑘.




which is at least 1 − 3 𝜖 for large enough 𝑘 . Over the sampling of the random edges, the probability
that at least two thirds of the blocks do not have random edges and are assigned the high-welfare
option by the mechanism is at least (1 − 3 𝜖 − 2/3)/(1 − 2/3) = 1 − 9 𝜖 . By union bound, with
probability at least 1 − 10 𝜖 , it additionally holds that there are 𝑜 (𝑘) random edges. Conditioned on
these events, hospital 1’s utility is at most
𝑜 (𝑘) 3 + 𝛼 2𝑘 + (1 − 𝛼) 3𝑘 ≤
(
7/3 + 𝑜 (1)
)
𝑘.
Using another union bound, with probability at least 1− 19 𝜖 , hospital 1 would receive at least 8/3𝑘
utility by hiding all the square nodes. Thus, we can add the full instance to our family since, with
constant probability, there is
(
1/3 − 𝑜 (1)
)
𝑘 ∈ Θ(𝑛) incentive for manipulation. □
B PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Lemma 3. Let there be a finite number of balls with colors in [𝑐], such that there are 𝑛1 ≥ 𝑛2 ≥
· · · ≥ 𝑛𝑐 many balls of each color. If 𝑛1 ≤
∑
𝑖≥2 𝑛𝑖 , the balls can be arranged in a cyclical sequence
such that no two adjacent balls have the same color. In particular, they can be ordered in a linear,
color-alternating sequence such that an arbitrary ball can be chosen as the first.
Proof. Imagine having 𝑛1 many stacks. Cycle through the stacks in order and always place
one ball on the current stack, going through the balls from the most prevalent color to the least
prevalent one. In the first pass through the stacks, we place one ball of color 1 at the bottom of
each stack. In the second pass, each stack receives a second ball because at most half of the balls
have color 1. Note that no stack will contain two balls of the same color because no color has more
than 𝑛1 balls, and, thus, every color will run out before reaching the same stack a second time. This
means that, if we append all final stacks into a cyclical list, no two balls of the same color touch. □
C PROOF OF THEOREM 8: ANALYSIS OF MECHANISM 2
Before showing that Mechanism 2 succeeds with high probability (Lemma 11), has high wel-
fare (Lemma 12), and is matching-time incentive compatible (Lemma 13), we start with a sequence
of general observations. These observations establish that the mechanism is well-defined and will
be used in the proofs of the later lemmas.
As before, we consider 𝑠 ′ and log𝑛 as integers, ignoring rounding complications that do not
influence asymptotic behavior. We assume the input to be “large enough” in terms of 𝑛 and 𝑠;
formally, there should be a check at the beginning of the mechanism that fails if 𝑛 is too low and
returns 𝜋IR in this case. Since, under truthful responses, this failure will only happen for small
graphs, this does not stand in the way of the mechanism succeeding with high probability. While
hospitals could manipulate to get to this case, this is disadvantageous with an argument akin to the
ones made in the proof of Lemma 13.
Hospitals 𝑖 are called active if their paths𝑖 is nonzero, i.e., whenever they have some internal
path of length 𝑠 . From line 7 on, we know that there are at least two active hospitals, one of which
must be 𝑎. Each active hospital 𝑖 must have paths𝑖 ≥ log𝑛 at this point. Thus, line 8 does not make
additional hospitals inactive, and it remains true that paths𝑖 ≥ log𝑛 for all active hospitals.
In line 10, it must hold that the total length of each Paths𝑖 is at least (𝑠/log𝑛) paths𝑖 . Indeed,
consider the original values of paths𝑖 before modification in line 8, which we call opaths𝑖 here. If
paths𝑖 ≥ opaths𝑖/log𝑛, by line 3, there are opaths𝑖/log𝑛 paths with average length 𝑠 , which satisfy
the conditions on Paths𝑖 ; the total length of Paths𝑖 can thus not be lower than opaths𝑖 𝑠/log𝑛 ≥
paths𝑖 𝑠/log𝑛. Else, by choosing the paths𝑖 longest paths from line 3, we obtain an average length
of at least 𝑠 , and a total length of even at least 𝑠 paths𝑖 .
The mechanism then removes very short paths and creates additional paths long enough for
stitching. In the removal of short paths in line 11, the total length of the corresponding Paths𝑖
might decrease by no more than 4 𝑠 ′ paths𝑖 . The following loop in lines 12 to 14 only redistributes
the total length within each Paths𝑖 without changing it. Thus, the total length must be at least
paths𝑖 (𝑠/log𝑛−4 𝑠 ′) in any iteration. Therefore, the longest path in Paths𝑖 must have length at least
𝑠/log𝑛 − 4 𝑠 ′ = (1 − 4/log𝑛) 𝑠/log𝑛, which for large 𝑛 is much larger than 8 𝑠 ′ = (8/log𝑛) 𝑠/log𝑛.
It follows that, after the for loop has finished in line 15, each Paths𝑖 has exactly paths𝑖 disjoint
paths, and that all of them have length at least 4 𝑠 ′. Note that, because we adjusted paths 𝑗 in line 8,
Lemma 3 allows us to arrange all paths in a cyclic sequence such that no two adjacent paths belong
to the same hospital.
In the do-while loop in lines 16 to 25, the mechanism performs a graph search from the altruist
among the vertices of active hospitals, attempting to find a path from the altruist to one of the
paths in the Paths𝑖 . Exp is a set of explored nodes, and a refers to the next node to be explored.
The loop must eventually terminate because the cardinality of Exp increases in every iteration and
because the loop terminates once this cardinality exceeds 𝑠 ′. Throughout this graph search, it is
maintained that the explored nodes are disjoint from all Paths𝑖 by removing short suffixes off these
paths. Furthermore, the size of Exp can never exceed 2 𝑠 ′, which implies that we never reduce the
length of any path below 4 𝑠 ′ − 2 𝑠 ′ = 2 𝑠 ′.
When a new node a is explored from line 17 on, we check whether this node lies on one of
the paths in the Paths𝑖 . If it is, we check in line 21 whether this node is at least 𝑠 ′ steps from the
end of the path. If it is not, we remove the suffix from the path and add the suffix to the explored
nodes to preserve the disjointness between paths and explored nodes. If it is far enough from
the end, we attempt to stitch in subprocedure stitch1(). By Lemma 3, we can find a cyclical
hospital-alternating sequence of the paths in
⋃
𝑖 Paths𝑖 , which makes the definition in line 2 of
stitch1() valid.
Note that the last 𝑠 ′ nodes of 𝜎 ′ come from 𝜎 and belong to the same hospital as 𝜋 , thus not to
the hospital owning 𝜋2. Furthermore, all later paths in the sequences defined in lines 4 and 6 have
minimum length 2 𝑠 ′. Thus, it makes sense to search for a stitching; if successful, the stitching will
be a single path starting at the altruist. The mechanismmight also fail if the stitching is unsuccessful,
which we will show only happens with low probability.
Back in the main body of Mechanism 2, if do-while loop terminates without returning, this might
be either because at least 𝑠 ′ nodes have successfully be explored, or because less than 𝑠 ′ nodes were
reachable among the active hospitals. In the latter case, the mechanism returns in line 27. Else, i.e.,
if at 𝑠 ′ have been explored, we check in line 28 if some neighbor 𝑣 ′ of an explored node 𝑣 is at the
start of some path 𝜋 ∈ ⋃𝑖 Paths𝑖 . If so, subprocedure stitch2() attempts to stitch ⋃𝑖 Paths𝑖 with
𝜋 at the front. Again, by Lemma 3, the paths can be arranged in a sequence starting at 𝜋 such that
path ownership alternates. Furthermore, every path has minimum length 2 𝑠 ′. The edge from 𝑣 to
the beginning of the path forms a stitch from a path out of the altruist to 𝜋 , which we can add to
the start of the stitched path if the rest of the stitching is successful. If no such neighbor can be
found, the mechanism fails in line 31.




, Mechanism 2 succeeds
with high probability under truthful reports.
Proof. Suppose that that the mechanism is run on the full graph. If the mechanism fails, it might
enter one of the subprocedures stitch1() or stitch2() and fail there, or it might fail in line 31.
Once the mechanism enters either of the subprocedures, there are at most |⋃𝑖 Paths𝑖 | stitches
between paths to be made; in each stitch, any one of 𝑠 ′2 edges existing suffices. Note that these
edges are all cross edges and that they are disjoint from the edges previously explored by the graph
search. Thus, independently from previous steps in the mechanism, the probability of a random
edge existing for a given stitch is 1− (1− 𝑝)𝑠′2 , and the existence of deterministic edges only makes
this probability higher. By a union bound over at most 𝑛 stitches, the probability of failure is at
most 𝑛 (1 − 𝑝)𝑠′2 ≤ 𝑒 log𝑛−𝑝 𝑠2/log(𝑛)4 → 0.
It remains to show that the mechanism is unlikely to fail in line 31. Once we enter the graph
search, fix paths 𝜋1 ∈ Paths𝑖1 and 𝜋2 ∈ Paths𝑖2 belonging to different hospitals 𝑖1, 𝑖2. Such paths
exist because at least two hospitals are active. Whenever a node a is added to Exp, the mechanism
has, at this point in time, not queried its outgoing edges. If the node does not belong to 𝑖1, there
are 𝑠 ′ possible random edges between a and the first 𝑠 ′ nodes of 𝜋1. Else, there are 𝑠 ′ possible
random edges between a and the first 𝑠 ′ nodes of 𝜋2. If, at any point during the graph search, one
of these edges is materialized, the mechanism can no longer fail in line 31. Because, whenever the
mechanism reaches line 28, it has explored at least 𝑠 ′ nodes, the probability of this failure mode
is at most (1 − 𝑝)𝑠′2 ≤ 𝑒−𝑝 𝑠2/log(𝑛)4 → 0. Therefore, the probability of failure anywhere in the
mechanism also tends to zero. □
Lemma 12. Suppose that 𝑠 ∈ 𝜔 (log(𝑛)2). Whenever Mechanism 2 succeeds under truthful reports, it
achieves welfare of at least
(
1 − 𝑜 (1)
)
|AvgOpt𝑠 |.
Proof. Assuming that the mechanism does not fail, we need to show that the resulting path
𝜋 has utility at least
(
1 − 𝑜 (1)
)
|AvgOpt𝑠 |. For each hospital 𝑖 , denote the set of 𝑖’s segments of
AvgOpt𝑠 by BM𝑖 , and |BM𝑖 | by bm𝑖 .
From the definition in line 3, the original value of paths𝑖 is clearly at least log𝑛 bm𝑖 . In particular,
inactive hospitals cannot have any nodes in AvgOpt𝑠 .
If the mechanism returns in line 6 because 𝑎 is inactive, there is no path satisfying the conditions
on AvgOpt𝑠 , and there is nothing to show. Else, if the mechanism returns in the same line because
no other hospital is active, AvgOpt𝑠 cannot use any other hospital’s subgraph. Therefore, selecting
𝜋IR obtains at least the welfare of the benchmark. Finally, if the mechanism returns in line 27, there
are fewer than 𝑠 ′ nodes reachable from the altruist within the active hospitals, who are a superset of
the hospitals who might possibly have segments in a path AvgOpt𝑠 . This shows that the benchmark
again is trivial. Since the returns in lines 6 and 27 are dealt with, and since we assumed that the
mechanism succeeds, it remains to consider cases in which the mechanism returns a successful
stitching.
Note that, since the owners of the segments of AvgOpt𝑠 alternate, bm𝑖 ≤
∑
𝑖′≠𝑖 bm𝑖′ + 1 for all 𝑖 .
Because paths𝑖 ≥ log𝑛 for at least two hospitals, and since log𝑛 ≥ 2 for large𝑛, we can continue this
chain as
∑
𝑖′≠𝑖 bm𝑖′ + 1 ≤
∑
𝑖′≠𝑖 (bm𝑖′ + paths𝑖′/2) ≤
∑
𝑖′≠𝑖 (paths𝑖′/log𝑛 + paths𝑖′/2) ≤
∑
𝑖′≠𝑖 paths𝑖′ .
Therefore, even after the modification in line 8, it holds for all 𝑖 that paths𝑖 ≥ bm𝑖 .
Thus, BM𝑖 satisfies the conditions on Paths𝑖 in line 10, and we know that the total length of
Paths𝑖 is at least that of BM𝑖 . It then suffices to show that, for each active hospital 𝑖 , the utility
of the path returned by the mechanism will be at least a
(
1 − 𝑜 (1)
)
fraction of the total length of
Paths𝑖 as defined in line 10. Summing up over all active hospitals (and remembering that AvgOpt𝑠
does not intersect the subgraphs of inactive hospitals), this will show that welfare is at least∑︁
active 𝑖
(1 − 𝑜 (1)) | |Paths𝑖 | | ≤
∑︁
active 𝑖
(1 − 𝑜 (1)) | |BM𝑖 | | = (1 − 𝑜 (1)) |AvgOpt𝑠 |.
We now show that a fixed active hospital 𝑖 obtains (1−𝑜 (1)) | |Paths𝑖 | | utility from the mechanism.
As observed above, the removal of small paths in line 11 reduces the total length of Paths𝑖 by at
most 4 𝑠 ′ paths𝑖 . Each stitching—whether in stitch1() or stitch2()—may lose up to 2 𝑠
′
nodes
for each path in Paths𝑖 (plus possibly 𝑠 ′ more in stitch1() for 𝜎 ′), which is another total loss of up
to 𝑠 ′ (2 paths𝑖 + 1). Furthermore, the graph search might cut off up to 2 𝑠 ′ nodes from paths in total,
possibly all of them from Paths𝑖 . Finally, the loss of up to 2 𝑠 ′ from possibly ignoring the prefix in
stitch1() is already accounted for in the stitching loss. Thus, at most 𝑠 ′ (6 paths𝑖 + 3) ≤ 9 𝑠 ′ paths𝑖
nodes in Paths𝑖 are not included in the final stitched path.
Since, as observed in the general remarks, the total length of Paths𝑖 is at least (𝑠/log𝑛) paths𝑖 , this




= 9/log𝑛 → 0. □
Lemma 13. Again, suppose that 𝑠 ∈ 𝜔 (log(𝑛)2). Assuming that Mechanism 2 succeeds under truthful




|𝜋 ∩𝑉𝑖 | utility by hiding vertices,
by diverting the path, or both.
Proof. Suppose again that the mechanism succeeds on the truthful graph. If it returns in line 6,
this is due to certain hospitals not having internal paths longer than 𝑠 , and hiding subsets of nodes
will not make the mechanism return elsewhere. Similarly, if the mechanism returns in line 27, fewer
than 𝑠 ′ are reachable from the altruist within the active hospitals. If a hospital hides nodes, this
can only reduce the set of active hospitals and the set nodes reachable within the active hospitals.
It is possible that hiding nodes would make the mechanism return in line 6 instead, but then the
mechanism would still return 𝜋IR. The mechanism cannot be manipulated into returning earlier
in line 22 because this would require 𝑠 ′ nodes to be reachable from the altruist within an active
hospital’s subgraph. Finally, the mechanism cannot be manipulated in executing lines past line 27
since, whenever the do-while loop ends, our assumption implies that the condition in line 26 is
true. While hiding nodes or diverting paths can lead to a different path than the true 𝜋IR being
chosen, such a manipulation cannot increase any hospital’s utility. Indeed, each such outcome is an
internal path of the altruist owner starting at the altruist. No hospital other than the altruist owner
can obtain non-zero utility, and the altruist owner’s utility is maximized under truthful reports.
We may thus assume that the mechanism returns a successful stitching under truthful reports. In
line 3, note that the definition of paths𝑖 is monotone in the reported hospital subgraph, i.e., hiding
nodes can only decrease the value. If a hospital is not selected in line 7 under truthful reports, no
manipulation by that hospital can change that. The hospital 𝑗 selected in line 7 may hide its nodes
in such a way that it is no longer selected, but, for this, the manipulated paths 𝑗 can be at most
max𝑖≠𝑗 paths𝑖 , which is a lower bound on the truthful paths 𝑗 after modification in line 8. If 𝑗 remains
the selected hospital, it cannot increase its paths 𝑗 either, because 𝑗 has no control over the value∑
𝑖≠𝑗 paths𝑖 . Thus, even after line 8, paths𝑖 is maximized by truthful reporting for each hospital 𝑖 . In
line 10, Paths𝑖 is defined such that its total length is monotone in paths𝑖 . Thus, revealing all nodes
maximizes this total length. In the argument for efficiency, we showed that each active hospital 𝑖
receives at least a
(
1 − 𝑜 (1)
)
fraction of this total length as their utility. It suffices to show that no
manipulation, including diverting the path, can obtain more utility than a
(
1 + 𝑜 (1)
)
fraction of the
total length of Paths𝑖 at the state of its definition in line 10 under truthful reports.
To begin, if a manipulation makes the mechanism return 𝜋IR in line 6, in line 27, or in one of
the failure states, no hospital 𝑖 can receive more utility than the total length of Paths𝑖 . Indeed, all
hospitals except for the altruist owner obtain zero utility from this outcome (and cannot divert the
path). Since the altruist owner 𝑎 is active, the singleton set with 𝜋IR (or with 𝜋IR diverted at some
point) would have been a valid choice for Paths𝑎 , which means that the total length of Paths𝑎 must
be at least the utility obtained in this scenario.
Thus, we can restrict our focus on manipulations that prompt the mechanism to return a
successful stitching. We claim that hospital 𝑖’s nodes that end up on the path (possibly diverted) are
always contained in paths𝑖 + 1 many disjoint 𝑖-internal paths, except for up to 2 𝑠 ′ additional nodes.
If this is indeed true, under truthful reporting, Paths𝑖 could have been set to the paths𝑖 longest of
these paths because the truthful paths𝑖 is at least as large as that under some manipulation. Thus,
if the total length of the truthful Paths𝑖 is ℓ and the utility of the path resulting from the deviation
is 𝑑 , it must hold that ℓ ≥ (𝑑 − 2 𝑠 ′) paths𝑖/(paths𝑖 + 1), i.e., that 𝑑 ≤ (1 + 1/paths𝑖 ) ℓ + 2 𝑠 ′. Since
ℓ ≥ (𝑠/log𝑛) paths𝑖 , since paths𝑖 ≥ log𝑛, and thus ℓ ≥ 𝑠 , the utility of the deviation is at most
ℓ (1 + 1/log𝑛 + 2/log(𝑛)2) ∈
(
1 + 𝑜 (1)
)
ℓ , as claimed.
We will now show this remaining claim, i.e., that all but up to 2 𝑠 ′ of hospital 𝑖’s nodes on a
successful stitching are contained in up to paths𝑖 + 1 disjoint paths. Without diverting paths, the
path produced by the mechanism is always a subset of
⋃
𝑖 Paths𝑖 plus up to 2 𝑠 ′ nodes to reach
these paths, which satisfies the claim with even only paths𝑖 disjoint paths.
We can thus concentrate on manipulations that divert the path. In stitch2(), and in stitch1()
if the path prefix is small (line 3), hospital 𝑖 will receive up to 2 𝑠 ′ nodes on the path out of the
altruist found by the graph search, and after this exactly paths𝑖 stitched segments. Diverting the
path at any point modifies one of these segments and removes the later segments. Thus, taking the
segments as up to paths𝑖 disjoint internal paths, the claim is satisfied.
It remains to consider the case where the prefix is long (line 5) in stitch1(). The path returned
by the mechanism will have up to 2 𝑠 ′ nodes in the beginning and then paths𝑖 + 1 segments. While
the segments 𝜋 and 𝜎 (which is the remainder of 𝜎 ′ after the nodes in the beginning) lie on a single
path, the hospital could divert the path to change this. In particular, it could divert 𝜋 such that it no
longer lies on a single path with 𝜎 . But even then, there are at most paths𝑖 + 1 segments, which
shows the claim. □
